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A B S T R A C T   
Environmental compensation should address negative impacts from human activities on nature, including loss of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. However, successful compensation, achieving no net loss, requires broad 
quantitative information on different types of losses and gains. We find that the scope of compensatory schemes 
varies in what is considered compensable, which makes it challenging to apply a conceptual approach consis-
tently across schemes with different needs. We propose a flexible yet structured framework for determining 
which values should be compensated and how. Our framework focuses specifically on habitat deterioration and 
is illustrated with a case study involving loss of eelgrass habitat. The framework helps identify compensation 
needs and selects among suitable compensation options, merging science-based information with normative 
issues and local concerns. By integrating the ecosystem services cascade model, it encompasses aspects from 
biodiversity structure to human wellbeing. The framework prefers in-kind compensation because this targets the 
structure level and thus meets compensation needs in all subsequent levels of the cascade model; further, it is 
more likely to capture non-instrumental values (i.e. in nature) and reduce exposure to uncertainty. We highlight 
the importance of spatial aspects of ecosystem functions, services and their subsequent impacts on wellbeing. 
Although our selection hierarchy assumes a “similar and nearby” principle for habitat restoration (preference for 
in-kind/on-site), this criterion is not universal. We underscore the hierarchy’s implicit normative assumptions and 
suggest that apparent disagreement about who should benefit may be traced to an unresolved conflict between 
egalitarianism and utilitarianism.   
1. Introduction 
Human wellbeing1 is dependent on environmental assets and flows 
provided by nature. Together, these contribute to the provision of 
ecosystem services, sometimes collectively referred to as natural capital 
(Haines-Young and Potschin, 2018; Hernández-Blanco and Costanza, 
2018; Missemer, 2018). Examples of these services include water 
purification, climate regulation, provisioning of food and raw material, 
and enabling recreational activities (de Groot et al., 2012; Maes et al., 
2016). A diverse suite of human activities causes environmental pres-
sure on ecosystems. This has caused, in turn, a global loss of biodiversity 
and deterioration in the supply of ecosystem services in both terrestrial 
and aquatic environments (Brondizio et al., 2019). Even relatively small 
deteriorations of ‘everyday landscapes’ may add up to significant 
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cumulative losses across various geographic scales (Steffen et al., 2015; 
Whitehead et al., 2017). 
In response to large-scale environmental deterioration, various pol-
icies are put in place to support protection and long-term sustainability. 
Countries have committed nationally and via global agreements to 
environmental goals for biodiversity and the supply of ecosystem ser-
vices, including an effort to halt current rates of deterioration or 
improving the situation (see e.g., EC, 2011, 2020; CBD, 2011a; UNDP, 
2016; Maron et al., 2018; IPBES, 2019). Further, government policies 
that make visible nature’s contribution to welfare, such as the infor-
mation and signaling effects from environmental taxes, has likely 
contributed to engagement of the private sector through e.g., natural 
capital assessment accounting (Peiffer and Haustermann 2017). Broker 
functions such as habitat banks are for example set to help match sup-
pliers of ecosystem services with developers that need to invest in them 
(Froger et al., 2015; Boisvert, 2015; Hahn et al., 2015; OECD, 2018). 
However, sustainability goals require additional concrete actions. In 
this setting, environmental compensation is put forward as one poten-
tially promising tool (CBD, 2011a; EC, 2011, 2019; Coralie et al., 2015). 
Sometimes referred to as biodiversity offsets2, and often used in 
conjunction with habitat banking or other mechanisms (Koh et al., 
2017), environmental compensation may suggest a way to allow 
essential development such as energy, housing, transportation, infra-
structure, while reducing or neutralizing any associated deterioration of 
environmental assets and flows. Environmental compensation focuses 
on the resource itself, i.e. compensation is “paid” to the public in terms 
of environmental resources rather than money (e.g. Cole 2011). In 
practice, compensation can take the form of projects that restore and/or 
improve common resources through measures such as habitat restora-
tion, species rehabilitation and/or resource enhancement designed to 
offset the impacts of environmental damage. Compensation has also 
been used ex post to address actual impacts following e.g., oil spills 
(Payne, 2016; Lipton et al., 2018; US DOI, 2019). 
As a policy intervention, environmental compensation requirements 
can address two recognized market failures3 known to acerbate envi-
ronmental deterioration: (1) the lack of ownership, which precludes 
return on investment and, thus, a key incentive for managing assets 
sustainably; and (2) the lack of price signals, which can preclude a full 
accounting of the net social benefits associated with environmental as-
sets and flows. This is critical, since the failure to recognize such benefits 
is known to lead to poor decision-making both publicly and privately as 
markets still tend to be decisive for when and how environmental assets 
and flows are consumed (Daily et al., 2009; Guerry et al., 2015; Hahn 
et al., 2015; Costanza et al., 2017). Environmental compensation re-
quirements essentially shift the burden of environmental damage costs 
from the public to the “polluters”, who must now consider compensation 
costs in their decision-making. 
However, the compensation mechanism means that some individuals 
will necessarily be better off and others worse off following a compen-
sation, assuming for example effects of localization decisions, time lags, 
or differences in preference among individuals. In fact, a Swedish ex post 
analysis of offsetting found an un-balanced distribution of costs and 
benefits associated with compensation, which raises normative ques-
tions of equity in compensation selection (Mellin et al. (in prep); see also 
Levrel et al., 2017 regarding re-distribution of benefits). A participatory 
process that investigates the preferences of those affected by the damage 
and/or compensation (“affected individuals”) may improve equity out-
comes (assuming vocal minorities do not exert disproportionate influ-
ence). However, the process itself should also be framed within 
authorities’ responsibilities regarding legal obligations and environ-
mental objectives, including consideration of future generations (IPBES 
2019). 
Implementation of environmental compensation has also been crit-
icized because it can be difficult in practice to balance successfully losses 
with gains (Josefsson et al., 2021). Opponents suggest that application 
of environmental compensation may in fact aggravate environmental 
deterioration by encouraging development in exchange for only sym-
bolic restoration projects or an overemphasis on “easy-to-implement” 
compensation projects that fail to account for complex ecosystem im-
pacts (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Howarth, 2013; Coralie et al., 
2015; Maron et al., 2016). Other critics underscore the importance of 
measuring human preferences to accurately account for impacts on 
wellbeing, which may be overlooked when simply matching biophysical 
loss with a biophysical gain (e.g., offsite bird restoration and viewing 
platform that is inaccessible to birdwatchers; Cole, 2011; Lipton et al., 
2018). 
Further, as an economic concept, compensation is inextricably linked 
to the “value” of a (lost) good, service or other benefit; in particular, 
which values should be compensated, how, and for whom? A funda-
mental demarcation in defining value can be found in two different 
philosophical viewpoints toward nature (e.g. Griffiths et al., 2019; 
Karlsson and Edvardsson Björnberg, 2020). On the one hand, an 
anthropocentric viewpoint focuses on the instrumental role of nature in 
enhancing human wellbeing. In contrast, a non-anthropocentric view-
point, such as zoocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism, emphasizes 
nature’s own moral standing, where the value of animals and other 
forms of life can be motivated by its own existence, independent of any 
benefit it may provide humans (CBD, 2011a; Vucetich et al., 2015). In 
relation to environmental management, we consider both of these 
philosophical viewpoints to apply, in the sense that nature can have 
instrumental value (for humans) as well as non-instrumental value. 
Further, their distinction can be helpful in assessing compensation 
needs.4 
The purpose of the paper is to present a conceptual framework for 
describing environmental damage in connection to physical develop-
ment and other human impacts on land use, identifying subsequent 
compensation needs, selecting preferred compensation options, and 
evaluating outcomes. The framework centers around habitat loss or 
deterioration and the resulting loss of ecosystem function and ecosystem 
services. It can be used to support national and local processes by sug-
gesting how actions to halt losses to biodiversity and ecosystem services 
can be identified and planned to address effects of human activities. 
Given this overarching aim, the framework is applicable in a variety of 
environmental settings (terrestrial or aquatic), policy scenarios (e.g., 
expected damage ex ante or actual damage ex post), and regulatory 
contexts aligned with the global sustainable development goals (see also 
below and Table 1). 
The framework’s contribution is providing a transparent set of op-
tions for decision-makers on how to select the most appropriate and 
precise compensation. It is, hence, not prescriptive, but helps decision- 
makers navigate the trade-offs and complications that arise in scaling 
compensation We present an example based on losses of habitat-forming 
marine eelgrass and consider a suite of hypothetical compensation op-
tions to underscore the real-world challenges faced by managers, 
including the need to evaluate off-site and out-of-kind options. Impor-
tantly, we examine environmental compensation as a tool to address 
2 Environmental compensation describes a concept that can be represented by 
similar terms, which can contribute to confusion around its intent and extent. 
The literature also refers to biodiversity offsetting, compensatory mitigation, 
compensatory measures, etc.  
3 Often defined as when a competitive market fails to produce an “optimal” 
outcome for society. Welfare economists study factors that can lead to market 
failure, the potential size of the subsequent welfare loss, and how/if govern-
mental intervention can steer these scenarios toward outcomes that increase 
social wellbeing (Johansson 1993). 
4 Note that non-instrumental value is frequently referred to as intrinsic value, 
although final value has been suggested as a more appropriate term, see 
Peterson and Sandin (2013). 
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residual losses of biodiversity and ecosystem services, assuming neces-
sary mitigation has already been undertaken to avoid and minimize 
damages for permitted projects that are otherwise deemed appropriate 
(BBOP, 2012; Arlidge v, 2018). 
We believe that a “structured flexibility”, as enabled by the frame-
work, is needed to help decision-makers conceptualize and implement 
compensation in way that it is useful across a variety of relevant regu-
latory contexts (see also Table 1): legal requirements (e.g., to enforce 
polluter pays principle, to ensure accountability to the public); policy 
obligations (e.g., to meet regional/global environmental objectives, to 
follow best practices); and normative judgements that can arise when 
considering “affected individuals”. We acknowledge that providing op-
tions for the compensation process is key to its successful implementa-
tion – especially when compared to the alternative of no or insufficient 
offsetting of residual damage – but a very high degree of flexibility 
admittedly increases risks for loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services 
(Bull et al., 2015). The proposed framework suggests how to reduce risks 
by making visible and safeguarding the full range of values to be 
compensated, while also addressing equity concerns via public 
participation. 
The framework prevents excessive flexibility through its theoretical 
anchoring in the concept of ecosystem services as a systematic means for 
communicating how humans interact with, and are dependent on, eco-
systems (Alcamo and Bennett 2003), integrating the ecosystem services 
cascade model to define the final outputs from an ecological system that 
benefit people (Haines-Young et al., 2012; Boyd et al., 2016; Haines- 
Young and Potschin, 2018). In a damage assessment context, our focus 
builds upon previous work in assessing impacts on nature values and 
their pathways (Elliott et al., 2017; Bryhn et al., 2020). Globally, the use 
of environmental compensation is shifting from a primary emphasis on 
offsetting biophysical changes to a wider scope that considers the ben-
efits ecosystems provide people (EC, 2011, 2019; Tallis et al., 2015; 
Bouwma et al., 2018; Griffiths et al., 2019; Lipton et al., 2018; Maron 
et al., 2018). As Sonter et al. (2020) note, this new scope increases the 
complexity of offsetting since it requires additional trade-offs between 
relevant benefits. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the 
underlying concepts to support our framework, which is then presented 
in Section 3. Section 4 illustrates the framework through a case study 
and Section 5 discusses implications of integrating the cascade model 
and our resource-based principles into a compensatory assessment. 
2. Underlying concepts 
2.1. Compensable values 
Table 1 provides a list of some of the legal, regulatory and policy 
schemes of relevance for environmental compensation and how these 
vary in their approaches to nature’s instrumental and non-instrumental 
values (see also Ives and Bekessy 2015). The purpose of this non- 
exhaustive list is to highlight a few examples of relevant policy con-
texts, which emphasize the importance of addressing different types of 
compensable values in a framework. For example, the US framework for 
Natural Resource Damage Assessment that focuses on making the 
Table 1 
Overview of some legal, regulatory and policy schemes and their apparent emphasis on nature’s instrumental vs. non-instrumental values.  
Scheme Relevant text Lawmakers’ apparent emphasis on 
relevant values to consider 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD 2011b) The CBD Strategy for Resource Mobilization includes an indicator about “…new and 
innovative financial mechanisms, which consider intrinsic values and all other values of 
biodiversity” (p. 6), where biodiversity offset mechanisms are mentioned as one 
example of such mechanisms (p. 20). 
Instrumental+Non-instrumental 
Bern Convention on the Conservation of European 
Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention 
1979) 
The 1979 Bern convention recognizes that “[…] wild flora and fauna constitute a 
natural heritage of aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational, economic and intrinsic value 
that needs to be preserved and handed on to future generations” (Preamble) 
Instrumental+Non-instrumental 
The European Union Habitats Directive (EC 2007) A development project may only be permitted (and thus require compensation 
projects) if there is an “overriding public interest”, suggesting anthropocentric values 
may trump negative impacts on environmental values (p. 3. Sec 1.1) 
If a project goes forward, ”The opinion has to cover the assessment of the ecological values 
. likely to be affected” (p. 23. Sec 1.8.3) 
Compensation projects should “[restore] the habitat to ensure the maintenance of its 
conservation value” (p. 14. Sec 1.4.3) 
Unclear 
United States NRDA (US OPA, 1990; US DOI, 2019) Purpose is to “make the environment and public whole for injuries to natural resources and 
services,” a clear reference to a welfare economics concept. Compensation projects are 
expected to offset economic damages (US OPA 1990, Sec. 990.10). 
Instrumental value 
The European Union Biodiversity Strategy (EC, 
2011, 2019, 2020) 
The previous 2020 goal: “The EU 2020 biodiversity target is underpinned by the 
recognition that, in addition to its intrinsic value, biodiversity and the services it provides 
have significant economic value that is seldom captured in markets.” (p. 2, EC, 2011) 
The revised 2030 strategy (EC, 2020) builds on methods consistent with “ … forward- 
looking, sustainable policy and planning processes [that] seek to improve ecosystem 
condition … [and that] improve biologically diverse, multifunctional ecosystems for their 
intrinsic value, as well as for their benefits to people and the economy.” (EC, 2019, p. 18.) 
Instrumental+Non-instrumental 
Business and Biodiversity Offset Program (BBOP, 
2012)1 
States that “Although the PCI [Principles, Criteria and Indicators] focus on the ecological 
aspects (i.e. intrinsic values) of biodiversity, the principles also embrace its socioeconomic 
and cultural values” (p. 1). 
Instrumental+Non-instrumental 
Swedish Environmental Code and Swedish EPA 
Guidelines on Environmental Compensation 
Swedish Code notes that “…Nature is recognized to have an independent protective value” 
and “Besides nature’s protective value in itself, nature and its resources are a precondition 
for economic productivity, welfare and human survival.”3Swedish EPA guidelines on 
compensation notes that “…nature’s value … includes the provision of ecosystem services, 
but also includes its own inherent protective value, including that of biological diversity 
itself.”2 
Instrumental+Non-instrumental  
1 Although BBOP has now completed its work and no longer exists, it has been an industry standard (see ten Kate et al. (2018)) 
2 Translated from Swedish (Swedish EPA (2016), p. 25). 
3 Translated from Swedish. Swedish Environmental Code description is based on a Statute comment in Swedish Government Bill 1997/98:45, p. 9. See also 
Strömberg (2016). 
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“public whole” following environmental damage (US OPA, 1990; US 
DOI, 2019) is clearly anthropocentric, with explicit and exclusive 
reference to instrumental values. Other schemes embrace a broader 
perspective in which non-instrumental values may be considered 
compensable (e.g. BBOP 2012). Although Table 1 provides only an 
indication of the variability across schemes, motivations based exclu-
sively on non-instrumental values appear rare, although such values are 
used as one type of motivation for introducing legal rights for nature 
(Chapron et al., 2019). However, as noted by Ives and Bekessy (2015), it 
is generally difficult to discern the fundamental intentions as the lan-
guage tends to be somewhat ambiguous. Further, terms describing 
values are often used differently across disciplines. However, practi-
tioners and the scientific literature are increasingly suggesting that both 
types of values should be considered in compensatory assessments, 
reflecting commitments taken by countries under the international 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 2011a; Griffiths et al., 2019). 
2.2. Cascade model and compensation 
By addressing how changes in ecosystem structure and function 
affect the supply of ecosystem services and associated human benefits, 
our conceptual framework adheres to the cascade model developed by e. 
g. Haines-Young et al. (2012) and La Notte et al. (2017). In our adap-
tation of this model (Fig. 1), ecosystem structure is represented by 
habitats and habitat-forming species, which on the one hand has non- 
instrumental values and on the other hand, forms the enabling basis 
for all functions occurring in the ecosystem, the provision of ecosystem 
services and subsequent human benefits. Hence, any residual impact of 
human activity on ecosystem structure may, via ‘cascading effects’, result 
in further impacts on ecosystem function, services and/or benefits. Note 
that impact on the structure level are primarily attributed to physical 
pressures, such as habitat loss or habitat replacement, but that impacts 
can also first occur on any of the other levels, with subsequent ‘cascading 
effects’ depending on the type of originating human-caused pressure. 
The cascade model is integral to our framework, not only because it 
enables understanding and measuring of both losses (negative impacts 
from the environmental damage, Fig. 1) and gains (positive impacts 
from compensation designed to offset losses, see Section 3), but also 
because it plays a key role in communicating a compensation assessment 
with stakeholders. 
In our framework the structure and function levels can be interpreted 
as representing both instrumental and non-instrumental values, as in 
Fig. 1. In this way the framework adheres both to those ecosystem ser-
vice classifications in which biodiversity is considered an ecosystem 
service per se, contributing instrumental value, and those where it is 
considered separately, i.e., also contributes value independent of human 
wellbeing (as discussed below, this suggests advantages of aiming 
compensation at the structure level). 
2.3. Context and definitions 
Our framework is place-based in the sense that it is applied with 
respect to impacts occurring in a specific location. It is intended to 
support decision-making primarily at the last step in the mitigation hi-
erarchy for project implementation, which aims to first avoid, then 
minimize, subsequently restore, and finally compensate any remaining 
negative environmental impacts (BBOP, 2012; Arlidge et al., 2018). 
Thus we define environmental compensation as a tool to offset any re-
sidual loss associated with the interfering human activity (Enetjärn 
et al., 2015), after appropriate mitigation measures are undertaken at 
the damage site. 
In our approach, a resource-based compensation project may consist 
of one or several individual measures, which can be aimed at compen-
sating either the impacted ecosystem structure or function, or the services 
and associated benefits to human wellbeing (Fig. 1). Two aspects are 
important here: First, the measure can be provided either “in-kind” (i.e., 
same ecosystem structure as the damaged resource and therefore also the 
same associated function, services, and benefits) or “out-of-kind” (an 
entirely or partially different ecosystem structure, function, service, or 
benefit). Second, the measures can be undertaken in close proximity to 
the damage site (“on-site”) or at a different and more distant location 
(“off-site”), where the latter implies that any potential benefits generated 
by the measure – including benefits that may be similar or somewhat 
different – will not reach those individuals affected by the loss. Box 1 
provides examples to illustrate the range of impacts and the types of 
compensation included in our definition (see also Bull et al., 2015).  
Box 1. Non-exhaustive examples of the scope of “environmental compensation” as 
defined in the framework. A hypothetical construction project leading to loss or 
deterioration of habitat and indirect local effects associated with the project. 
Examples of likely damages Examples of relevant environmental 
compensation projects 
Permanent impacts The following projects may be relevant 
on-site or off-site: 
• Loss of habitat, here primarily 
identified as migratory bird habitat 
• Restoration or rehabilitation of lost 
habitat type (“in-kind”) 
• Closure of a recreational access point to 
a popular park/reserve 
• Protection of migratory bird habitat 
elsewhere that is otherwise threatened 
• Increased noise levels associated with 
road use impairs ways in which the 
area can be used by people and wildlife 
• Predator control or regulatory 
measures to reduce total migratory bird 
mortality 
Temporary impacts • Creation of alternative migratory bird 
habitat 
• Nuisances such as increased noise 
levels and dust during construction 
• Construction of new recreational 
access points 
• Trail closure during construction • Improvement of other existing 
recreational trails/facilities  
• Establishment of a “quiet” reserve that 
restricts noise levels  
• Other projects that improve or protect 
similar resources that the public accepts 
as compensation for those lost (“out-of- 
kind”)  
3. A suggested framework 
Compensation planning typically involves four steps: assessing 
damage, assessing compensation needs, selecting compensation options, 
and evaluating outcomes (Fig. 2). Our framework provides conceptual 
guidance to support these steps, which are described in Sections 3.1 to 
3.4. 
3.1. Assessing damage (Step 1) 
The first step of the framework uses the cascade model as a roadmap 
to describe potential damage pathways. The approach “casts the net 
Fig. 1. Conceptual overview of compensable values. Adaptation of the 
ecosystem services cascade model to include instrumental values (symbolized 
by white boxes) and non-instrumental values in ecosystem structure and 
function (symbolized by shaded boxes). Our adaptation helps to better under-
stand the negative impacts from environmental damage (losses), which subse-
quently ensures a more comprehensive assessment of compensation need 
(gains). Negative impacts associated with physical development are most likely 
to occur on the structural level, as symbolized by the thicker upper arrow. 
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wide” in identifying potentially relevant benefits generated by a given 
ecosystem and how they may be impacted (see e.g., Olander et al., 2015) 
(Fig. 3). Pressures impacting the structure level (e.g. habitat deteriora-
tion or loss) are generally expected to lead to subsequent loss of all 
connected functions, services and benefits via ‘cascading effects’ (red 
boxes in Fig. 3a). In addition, in some cases, impacts at lower levels of 
the cascade may only occur when they are directly connected via a 
damage pathway at that level (red and green boxes in Fig. 3b-d). Last, 
impacts on benefits may also occur independent of the cascade model 
(Fig. 3e). The loss of these cascade-independent benefits, while not 
directly linked to the affected habitat, are nonetheless connected to 
coinciding human activities and thus relevant in a damage assessment 
(see Section 4.1 for an example involving eelgrass). 
3.2. Identifying compensation needs (Step 2) 
The second step involves identifying compensation needs based on 
the cascade model and, if relevant, modifying these to meet any stake-
holder objectives. Compensation needs are highlighted via the cascade 
model by an analysis to identify gaps, where negative impacts may be 
either full or partial (Fig. 4). Fig. 4a illustrates a case when negative 
impacts at the structure level lead to full loss in all subsequent levels, 
suggesting that compensation aimed at the structure level – via e.g. 
creation or restoration of habitat – would compensate all linked losses to 
functions, services and benefits. Alternatively, impacts on ecosystem 
function(s) affect only a portion of the subsequent ‘downstream’ impacts, 
suggesting less extensive compensation needs (Fig. 4b), e.g., impacts to a 
migratory route that do not significantly impact a local habitat structure. 
Note that this process can be, but is not restricted to, establishing a 
compensation objective based on “No Net Loss of Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services” (see e.g., EC, 2007; Maron et al., 2018). 
Since compensation needs are also a function of local context, this 
step importantly provides flexibility for decision-makers regarding 
compensation needs suggested by the cascade model: Fig. 4b and c have 
the same identified damages, with impacts on the ecosystem function 
level. The final compensation needs for (b) suggest full compensation for 
all affected ecosystem services, whereas in (c) a subset of the affected 
ecosystem services are only partially compensated. The yellow boxes 
reflect increased substitution possibilities associated with the service/ 
benefit levels. In this case, two of the three damaged ecosystem services 
are fully compensated (green) and the third is partially compensated 
(yellow). A partial compensation need is also identified for a fourth 
ecosystem service, which represents a modification to balance the fact 
that full compensation for all three damaged ecosystem services was not 
possible (or perhaps desired). 
The final compensation needs can meet stakeholder objectives at two 
different levels: first, in relation to overarching objectives, such as 
ensuring consistency with strategic planning, environmental goals or 
legal obligations (e.g., halting the loss of biodiversity, interests of future 
generations, reducing environmental impacts of infrastructure, etc); and 
second, on a more local level in relation to specific and normative 
principles that consider the needs of affected individuals in the current 
generation (see e.g., McKenzie et al., 2011; Scholte et al., 2016). The 
cascade model offers a language for discussion of these general ap-
proaches and viewpoints – including how and when they may conflict – 
which allows for a more fruitful integration of compensation needs with 
stakeholder objectives (see also Sonter et al., 2020). 
3.3. Selecting compensation (Step 3) 
In the third step, the final compensation needs are examined in 
relation to a hierarchy of preferred options, where the cascade model is 
used to support a gaps analysis and identify the preferred compensation 
option(s) (Fig. 5). The hierarchy adheres to the principle that those 
affected by damage should benefit from the compensation, and priori-
tizes on-site compensation. However, it also considers options related to 
resource type (in-kind/out-of-kind) and resource location (on-site/off- 
site). Although the “nearby and similar” principle for compensation se-
lection is well established in the literature (BBOP 2012), our framework 
is designed to be applicable across a variety of compensatory contexts, 
including situations where residual losses are unavoidable; on-site and/ 
or in-kind are not technically or practically feasible; a regulatory scheme 
has certain requirements (e.g., out-of-kind must be considered); or 
compensation in some form must be obtained from a responsible party for 
de facto losses (ex post schemes). 
Since the final compensation project may consist of several indi-
vidual measures, we distinguish between primary measures, which are 
the principal focus, and complementary measures, which strive to fulfill 
any compensation needs not met by the primary measure (including 
possible equity concerns) using additional out-of-kind approaches. We 
present the hierarchy of preferred compensation options below and then 
discuss considerations for making a final compensation selection. 
First option: Primary measure ¼ in-kind/on-site 
The framework places an emphasis on first the resource type (in-kind 
measures are preferred over out-of-kind measures), and second the 
resource location (on-site measures are preferred over off-site measures). 
This is preferred because: 
In-kind measures, provided they are successful, are the only way to 
address possible non-instrumental values, linked e.g. to biodiversity, 
given an assumption that trade-offs between non-instrumental values 
are not an option (i.e., in-kind/on-site compensation is by definition 
linked to that particular structure/function). Further, in-kind measures, 
if successful, provide more reliable compensation gains as they avoid 
ecosystem complexities by not having to rely on uncertain links in the 
cascade model between the upper levels (structure/function) and the 
(downstream) levels related to wellbeing. As a consequence, they tend to 
require fewer measures to achieve a compensation goal. 
On-site measures are more likely to deliver benefits to those in-
dividuals that are affected by the damage, since all structure-dependent 
benefits are compensated for. 
If successfully implemented and correctly scaled, the first option 
meets all compensation needs identified by the cascade model and thus 
requires no complementary measures (with the possible exception of 
cascade-independent impacts on benefits, Fig. 3e). 
Second option: Primary measure ¼ in-kind/off-site 
If in-kind compensation is not feasible on-site (due to e.g. lack of 
suitable locations), the second option is in-kind compensation off-site. 
The selected off-site location should exhibit suitable living conditions for 
the structure subject to compensation and should be as close as possible 
to the damaged site (as in First option above). However, as off-site 
measures will not compensate the local impacts, additional comple-
mentary (out-of-kind) measures will be warranted on-site (i.e., the second 
option does not, by definition, meet compensation needs as well as the 
first option). 
Last option: Primary measure = out-of-kind 
If in-kind compensation is not feasible within the relevant spatial 
context, the last option is to use several out-of-kind measures either on- 
site or off-site. Although this will rarely ensure the same level of 
compensation as the first or second options, we suggest a key guiding 
principle to optimize the outcome: a preference for measures aimed as 
high up on the cascade levels as possible, since these are more likely to 
capture any possible non-instrumental values, to lead to a broader range 
of subsequent benefits and to require fewer measures to achieve a given 
compensation goal. Note that this suggests at least the function level, 
since structure is not relevant when using out-of-kind. We emphasize, 
however, that the last option will not fully meet the principle that those 
affected by the damage should benefit from the compensation. This is 
obvious when measures take place off-site, but even if they are on-site the 
population receiving the gains are, by definition, receiving different 
benefits than those that were lost, since the compensation is provided 
out-of-kind. Further, the last option entails a high risk of not meeting 
compensation needs related to losses of biodiversity. In part because of 
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these drawbacks some policies and guidelines advise against (or restrict) 
the use of out-of-kind compensation. However, the option remains 
widely discussed (see e.g., Habib et al., 2013; Bull et al., 2015). There-
fore, we include it to provide decision-makers with a transparent 
approach for understanding the consequences and trade-offs between 
compensation options. 
While complementary measures will certainly be needed under the 
second option, they may even be warranted under all three compensa-
tion options, if there are cascade-independent impacts on benefits 
(Fig. 3e). They may also be warranted to address interim losses that can 
occur between the time when the damage occurs and the compensation 
is fully implemented (Cole, 2011; Bull et al., 2014) or to address 
stakeholder objectives or vulnerable groups. 
Final compensation selection 
The preferred compensation options (Fig. 5) provide a basis for a 
final compensation selection, which should consider stakeholder ob-
jectives (step 2) and the trade-offs between options in the hierarchy. For 
example, ecological risk trade-offs exist generally between the three 
options: low risk with in-kind/on-site compensation; higher risk with in- 
kind/off-site; highest risk with out-of-kind. In other cases, legal trade-offs 
may exist when developing local compensation rules, such as whether to 
allow out-of-kind compensation. Finally, there may be case-specific 
trade-offs such as a decision between (a) out-of-kind but on-site and (b) 
in-kind but off-site. In such cases, the framework’s process for modifying 
compensation needs (step 2) can guide decision makers: for example, all 
else equal (a) may be more attractive if those individuals affected by the 
damage are part of a vulnerable group that require extra consideration; 
alternatively (b) may be more attractive if emphasis is placed on no net 
loss. Further, it could include an overview of distributional effects to 
determine who is affected, who benefits, and whether impacts may 
affect vulnerable groups disproportionately (e.g., socioeconomically 
disadvantaged, elderly, children, etc). 
Finally, if compensation assessment is part of the permission process 
itself,5 the framework allows for decision-makers to consider an “off-
ramp” option (dotted arrow in Fig. 5). For example, after considering all 
three preferred options, some decision makers may still be uncomfort-
able with a ‘compensation solution’ (or may be legally required to 
consider other solutions). In this case the offramp offers avoidance 
rather than compensation, i.e., reconsiders the suitability of the impact- 
causing project. Such an outcome may occur if the framework makes 
clear that compensation of residual losses is either not technically 
possible, not preferred by affected individuals, limited by local guide-
lines, or simply turns out to be riskier than originally envisioned. Note 
that the offramp option is not relevant if the permission process is 
separate from compensation assessment (as suggested in Sweden; 
Swedish EPA, 2016). 
3.4. Evaluating outcomes (Step 4) 
A post-project evaluation should compare the compensation 
outcome(s) to the final compensation needs (Fig. 4) after a specified 
Fig. 2. Overview of framework. Lower row specifies the framework’s contribution to each of the four steps typically found in a compensation assessment. Sections 
3.1–3.4 and Figs. 3–5 provide details. 
Fig. 3. Assessing damage using the cascade model (Step 1). Possible pathways include negative impact on structure, causing subsequent impact to all underlying 
levels via ‘cascading effects’ (red boxes in (a)). It may also impact on function(s) level (b) or ecosystem service(s) level (c), causing impact to these levels and sub-
sequent levels via ‘cascading effects.’ Finally, it may impact on the human benefit level (d) or other relevant but cascade-independent benefits (e). 
5 When compensation is required as part of the permitting process, then all 
options are on the table, including out-of-kind, which may be the only feasible 
alternative. 
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time period, and against a “no compensation” scenario. This evaluation, 
and subsequent adaptive management, can also be guided by the 
cascade model, which can help identify parsimonious follow-up in-
dicators to determine whether the compensation objective is met, i.e., 
cascade losses are matched by cascade gains. Useful indicators can save 
resources for both the responsible polluter (to evaluate their commit-
ments) and the authorities (to ensure transparency). By tracing links in 
the cascade model attention can be focused on the indicators with the 
greatest potential bearing on outcomes that matter the most – including 
underlying levels of the cascade and/or the benefits provided. In 
conjunction with local legal requirements, such evaluation may provide 
the basis for additional compensation requirements, penalties, contin-
gency plans and/or other measures to address possible failures. 
4. Application: compensation for habitat loss in a coastal area 
The variety of compensatory approaches that the framework can 
handle, and the important policy issues that are raised by this work, are 
illustrated by a hypothetical case involving the loss of eelgrass meadows 
(Zostera marina L.) due to construction of a marina along the Swedish 
west coast. Eelgrass is a seagrass species of temperate waters with 
importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services (Orth et al., 2006; 
Barbier et al., 2010). We choose this example because the eelgrass 
ecosystem is well-studied (Table 2) and methods for eelgrass restoration 
are well developed (e.g. Fonseca et al., 1998; Short et al., 2000; Orth 
et al., 2012; Moksnes et al., 2016). For example, it is regularly used for 
environmental compensation in the US (e.g. NOAA, 2014). As the pro-
posed framework is still novel, real-world illustrations of its approach do 
not yet exist. Therefore, in order to show how managers could apply the 
concepts in real and potentially complex policy situations, we generate 
hypothetical scenarios that motivate three complete compensation op-
tions based on the framework’s hierarchy (Fig. 5). We discuss key con-
siderations for selecting from among these options, any of which could 
be feasible in a given location and context. The example is relevant in 
Sweden, where avoiding losses of eelgrass meadows, and preferably 
enhancing them, is motivated both by the EU Biodiversity Strategy 
(Table 1) and status assessments in relation to the EU Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive and Water Framework Directive. According to 
Swedish environmental legislation, compensatory measures should be 
considered in the case of unavoidable damages to habitats of importance 
for biodiversity and ecosystem services. Further, the Swedish Agency for 
Marine and Water Management has published guidelines and methods 
for eelgrass restoration, which they suggest could be applied to cases 
involving environmental compensation as a tool to protect or enhance 
these habitats (Moksnes et al., 2016). 
4.1. Assessing damage 
In western Sweden, eelgrass grows on soft substrates in shallow 
waters, where it contributes to several ecosystem functions by effects on 
the physical, chemical and biological environment. This, in turn, results 
in a number of ecosystem services and benefits, of which the most well- 
documented are illustrated in Table 2 and Fig. 6 (Rönnbäck et al., 2007; 
Cole and Moksnes, 2016; Nordlund et al., 2016). The knowledge base for 
the eelgrass ecosystem and the benefits they provide along the Swedish 
west coast is well-documented (Rönnbäck et al., 2007; Stål et al., 2008; 
Cole and Moksnes, 2016; Röhr et al., 2018). 
In our example, we assume that an eelgrass meadow is lost perma-
nently due to marina construction and, as a result, all eelgrass functions, 
services and benefits are also lost permanently (Table 2; Fig. 6(1)). For 
example, the loss of the eelgrass function “dampening of waves” leads to 
loss of services “decreased beach erosion” and “decreased sediment 
resuspension” and, ultimately, to loss of benefits associated with beach 
recreation (due to decreased visibility affecting users). By linking eco-
systems and the subsequent benefits – including the spatial scale over 
which they occur – the cascade model can help avoid the problem of 
Fig. 4. Identifying compensation needs using the cascade model (Step 2). Potential outcomes for compensation needs suggested by the cascade model: In outcome 
(a), comprehensive compensation needs are suggested since impact on the structure level leads to complete loss of all subsequent levels via ‘cascading effects’: 
function, service, and benefits (Note: green boxes in the middle are identical to the green and hashed boxes in the last column). Fewer green boxes in (b) suggests less 
extensive compensation needs suggested by the cascade model since the impact only affects some of the functions and hence a portion of the downstream levels (green 
boxes in the last column). Finally, the yellow boxes in (c) suggest the possibility to modify compensation needs suggested by the cascade model to meet stakeholder 
objectives (see text). Note both (a) and (b) assume no modification of the compensation needs suggested by cascade model and (c) assumes modification occurs on the 
ecosystem service and benefit levels. 
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double-counting impacts, i.e., inadvertently capturing the same value 
associated with an impact multiple times (see example under Sec 4.2). 
In addition to losses related to the eelgrass meadow, we assume 
impacts to some cascade-independent benefits (see Fig. 6(2)). For 
example, marina construction activity may permanently close a recre-
ational access point, which would lead to recreation losses; alterna-
tively, the noise, dust or other disturbance may diminish the 
recreational experience for local users (cf. Box 1). The loss of these 
benefits, while not directly linked to the affected habitat, are nonethe-
less connected to coinciding human activities and thus relevant in a 
damage assessment. 
The metrics chosen in the damage assessment are a foundation for 
the compensation assessment and, in some cases involving comple-
mentary compensation, several different metrics may be required. If 
eelgrass compensation will be in-kind, the damage may be expressed in 
units of habitat area (i.e. hectares of lost eelgrass). In other cases, an 
eelgrass ecosystem function or service may be expressed as e.g. kg of lost 
cod production or tons of released carbon (Table 2). In some cases, 
monetary metrics may be used to assess the change in wellbeing asso-
ciated with an ecosystem benefit, e.g., willingness to pay for a recrea-
tional beach visit (see e.g., Lipton et al., 2018; US DOI, 2019). 
4.2. Identifying compensation needs 
Our default example assumes a goal of “No Net Loss of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services” (see Section 3.2). Relying on the cascade model 
compensation needs will, under this scenario, cover the full range of 
negative impacts (i.e., convert all red boxes in Fig. 6 to green 
“compensated” boxes in Fig. 7). Alternatively, the stakeholder process 
could potentially lead to identification of other final compensation 
needs (see Section 3.3). Importantly, in the example of eelgrass 
meadows, its associated benefits occur on different spatial scales (local, 
regional, global), which may affect final compensation needs, including 
the need for complementary measures. Further, the valuation of losses 
and gains can depend on location, and hence affect the type and extent 
of compensation needs (see Table 2 and examples below). 
Given any of these objectives, the ensuing compensation measures 
may aim to restore eelgrass habitat structure, replace ecosystem functions 
or improve benefits. As an example, juvenile fish production (service) 
from an eelgrass bed benefits both recreational fishing (improved rec-
reational experience from higher catches) and commercial fishers 
(increased income from higher catches) on a regional level. The cascade 
model structure focusing on final beneficiaries (instead of the interme-
diate production of fish) identifies these two distinct user groups to 
whom separate and “additive” benefits accrue, which can be reflected in 
the compensation needs.6 The cascade model can also help stakeholders 
identify measures that provide multiple benefits – all else equal, such 
measures represent more attractive compensation options. For example, 
eelgrass restoration in one location may provide recreational benefits for 
both cod fishing and swimming, while the same restoration in an 
alternative location where habitat availability is not limiting for the cod 
production, would predominantly benefit swimming. 
Fig. 5. Framework’s hierarchy for selecting compensation options (Step 3). Assuming those affected by damage should benefit from the compensation, the 
framework’s hierarchy of preferred compensation options suggests: on-site compensation aimed in-kind at the structure level. If not feasible, a second option is in-kind 
compensation off-site (provided suitable conditions at compensation site) together with complementary measures on-site to address local non-compensated impacts. If 
the second option is not feasible, the last option relies on out-of-kind measures, preferably aimed as high up on the cascade levels as possible. All options may require 
additional complementary measures in order to address possible cascade-independent impacts on benefits (white boxes outside the cascade pyramid) or to address 
interim losses. Complementary measures are, by the framework’s definition, out-of-kind. Final compensation selection depends on stakeholder objectives and con-
siderations of the trade-offs between options. If compensation is part of the permitting process an offramp affords decision-makers an alternative to a ‘compensa-
tion solution’. 
6 We acknowledge that environmental compensation schemes typically cover 
recreational impacts, such as those to recreational fishers but income losses to 
commercial fisheries are addressed through other liability schemes (Lipton 
et al. 2018; US DOI 2019). 
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4.3. Selecting compensation 
Below we describe three preferred compensation options (in the 
order suggested by the hierarchy) for the eelgrass loss based on the 
framework’s principles. 
4.3.1. First option: In kind/on-site 
The first option (in-kind, on-site) suggests restoration of an eelgrass 
meadow at the damage site. If the restoration is successful, all losses of 
ecosystem functions, services and benefits will be compensated for (green 
boxes, Fig. 7a(1)). However, since it takes time for a restored meadow to 
provide the same services as a natural meadow (up to 10 years or more; 
see e.g. Marbá et al., 2015), there will be an interim loss7, which sug-
gests the need for additional complementary compensation. This can be 
provided by simply restoring a larger eelgrass area than was lost. In 
practice, this is often achieved by using habitat scalars (i.e., suggested 
habitat area ratios of “loss-to-gain”). The proposed policy for eelgrass in 
Sweden suggests restoring 30% larger eelgrass meadow than the one 
lost, if restoration is started in the same year as the damage occurs 
(Moksnes et al., 2016), while eelgrass mitigation scalars in California 
explicitly account for the risk of failure (NOAA 2014). 
The first option has the advantage that ecosystem functions and ser-
vices that provide local benefits (e.g., dampening of waves and decreased 
wave erosion) are more likely to reach those affected by the damage. 
Further, it can be scaled using a single metric (e.g., habitat area), which 
can facilitate assessing, scaling, and evaluating compensation. However, 
in this example, we assume that construction activity affects recreational 
benefits that are independent of eelgrass structure, which therefore re-
quires additional complementary measures (e.g., improve beach access 
nearby with e.g., boardwalks, stairs, or other attributes valued by 
beachgoers, Fig. 7a(2)). 
4.3.2. Second option: in-kind/off-site 
Since the first option may not be feasible due to a lack of suitable 
sites or environmental conditions for restoration (Fonseca et al., 1998; 
Moksnes et al., 2018), the second option suggests in-kind/off-site – 
assuming a good compensation site can be found (Fig. 7b(1)). Re- 
creating a similar eelgrass meadow at a favorable off-site location 
would compensate for the original loss by generating the same types of 
ecosystem functions and benefits as the first option, but some functions 
will only benefit those near the compensation site. For example, the 
ability of eelgrass to stabilize sediment, which decreases sediment 
resuspension and beach erosion and improves beach recreation, acts on 
a local scale (see Table 2, Fig. 6). If such benefits were critical at the 
damaged site, then off-site compensation, even if only a few hundred 
meters away, will not prevent e.g. beach erosion at the site where it is 
needed. Thus, ecosystem services related to stabilization of sediment 
will never be compensated for with an off-site measure. In contrast, 
carbon removal provides benefits on a global scale and is independent of 
location. As the distance between the compensation site and the damage 
site increases, more and more benefits will not reach the damage site, 
which argues for (additional) complementary measures to ensure full 
compensation. 
In the in-kind/off-site example illustrated in Fig. 7b, the nutrient 
removal from the restored meadow at the compensation site is consid-
ered to be sufficiently close to provide full benefits at the damage site, 
the enhanced production of fish and biodiversity from the meadow will 
provide some benefits at the damage site, but will not compensate all 
losses, whereas the loss of sediment stabilization at the damage site will 
receive no compensation from the restored meadow. To compensate 
these local losses, one could suggest an (additional) complementary 
measure aimed at the ecosystem function level: construction of a wave 
breaker of rocks at the damage site (Fig. 7b(2)). This (out-of-kind) 
measure is expected to dampen waves and stabilize the sediment and 
thereby fully compensate the lost benefits related to sediment resus-
pension and beach erosion. The submerged part of the rocks may be 
colonized by algae and animals over time and thereby could contribute 
to improved biodiversity and fish production at the damaged site. 
However, since the hard substrate produces a different biological com-
munity compared to eelgrass, it will only provide partial compensation 
toward these services. Although the combination of off-site restoration 
helps to provide reasonably complete compensation, the second option 
will not fully reach the no net loss objective achieved by the first option. 
Finally, complementary measures to address loss of cascade- 
independent benefits, as in the first option (improve beach access, 
Fig. 7b(3)). 
We emphasize that off-site compensation should consider the envi-
ronmental and social conditions across sites. For example, the eelgrass 
structure may differ in functions at the compensation site (e.g., different 
production, shoot density, canopy height, areal extent, etc.), which can 
Table 2 
Illustration of the ecosystem services cascade model applied to eelgrass: Examples of functions, ecosystem services, and benefits provided by eelgrass habitat structure. 
The last two columns show examples of metrics for assessing damage and compensation and the scale at which benefits are experienced. Benefits that occur on different 
spatial scales (local, regional, global) can affect the net impact on wellbeing and thus compensation scaling (see examples in text).  




Habitat for plants and animals Maintenance of high production 
and biodiversity 
Opportunities for research, 
education, recreation, 
Diversity and abundance of species Regional 
High juvenile production of fish 
and crustaceans 
Commercial fish catch, improved 
recreational fishing 
No. of juvenile cod; monetary value Regional2 
Dampening of waves, sediment 
stabilization 
Decreased beach erosion Improved recreational experience 
(beachgoing) 
Sediment transport; monetary value Very local 
Decreased resuspension and 
clearer water 
Improved recreational experience 
(swimming) 
Turbidity, water clarity (e.g. Secchi depth); monetary 
value 
Local 
Sequestration of organic 
material 
Removal and long-term storage 
of nutrients 
Decreased damages from 
eutrophication on society 
Tons of nutrients released from sediment and 
sequestered per year; monetary value 
Regional 
Removal and long-term storage 
of carbon 
Decreased damages from climate 
change 
Tons of carbon released from sediment and 
sequestered per year; monetary value 
Global  
1 Metrics may focus on measuring the biophysical change directly or on monetary metrics that value the change in wellbeing associated with the loss or gain of 
benefits (for e.g., beach recreation, commercial fish catch, recreational fishing, climate mitigation, etc.). 
2 Regional benefits may accrue in this case to both commercial and recreational fishers (see example in text). 
7 All else equal, interim losses suggest that a permanent loss requires greater 
compensation than a temporary loss (e.g., boat propeller injuries to eelgrass 
may recover over time whereas marina construction impacts are permanent). 
Further, an interim loss can be avoided if the compensation site is constructed 
prior to the loss, such that there is no interruption in the delivery of services. 
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affect provision of services. Further, the value of provided services may 
differ depending on spatial conditions; in general, an eelgrass bed will 
have a higher value if the ecosystem function is “locally limiting” for the 
production of the service and/or if the benefit is in short supply or high 
demand (Cole and Moksnes 2016). For example, if nursery habitats for 
juvenile fish are in short supply in an area and limiting for the recruit-
ment, the eelgrass bed will have a higher value than in an area with a 
surplus of nursery habitats (Sundblad et al., 2014), highlighting the 
importance of assessing the spatial extent. Such differences can be 
accounted for in compensation by increasing the scale of in-kind 
compensation (e.g., restore a larger area) or using additional out-of-kind 
compensation (see below). 
4.3.3. Last option: out-of-kind 
There may be local situations where in-kind compensation for 
eelgrass is not possible due to lack of knowledge, lack of tested methods, 
or lack of suitable sites within a reasonable distance from the damaged 
site. In these scenarios, out-of-kind compensation (either on or off-site) 
may be the only available alternative, even if it cannot fully achieve the 
compensation objective. 
Out-of-kind compensation requires creativity in re-creating similar 
benefits to those that were lost. The benefits may be linked to different 
ecosystem structures that provide similar benefits or may be entirely in-
dependent of structure and instead be based on human-designed sub-
stitutes. However, such measures admittedly contribute to additional 
physical alterations in the coastal environment which should be 
considered. Out-of-kind measures may only be possible in compensation 
schemes that allow for flexibility in design (Bull et al., 2015); further, it 
assumes that the public values the loss and gain equally, even though the 
characteristics of both may differ significantly. 
An exhaustive list of potential out-of-kind measures for eelgrass 
damages is beyond the scope of this illustration, and therefore not 
included in Fig. 7. However, the cascade model in Fig. 6 can provide a 
structure to help identify relevant approaches. For example, out-of-kind 
compensation could target the ecosystem function level by creating 
artificial reefs, which provide habitat for plants and animals that rely on 
eelgrass for substrate; or focus on creating or restoring coastal wetlands 
to sequester nutrients. Another approach could be to focus on relevant 
benefits by e.g., improving access to beaches or enhancing valued 
attributes like showers, boardwalks, more frequent seaweed clean up, 
etc. 
4.4. Evaluating outcomes 
At the overarching level an evaluation of compensation outcomes in 
the eelgrass example would address the question: “Have we reached no 
net loss?” At the more specific level, measurable goal formulation is 
critical. Further, field monitoring should account for the fact that some 
ecosystem services provided by eelgrass will require many years after 
restoration to reach the levels provided in established natural meadows. 
Guidelines elsewhere recommend that restored meadows be monitored 
for 5–10 years before evaluating results, and should be compared to 
relevant nearby reference sites, which can help model the natural 
variation in areal extent and provision of ecosystem services (see ex-
amples by Fonseca et al. (1998); NOAA (2014); Moksnes et al. (2016)). 
The cascade model supports evaluation by helping to specify which 
ecosystem services are expected from the compensation measures (e.g. 
biodiversity, abundance of juvenile fish, water clarity, carbon and 
nutrient content in the eelgrass sediment), and which should be the 
focus of follow-up monitoring. 
5. Discussion 
Existing frameworks for compensation face a challenge in balancing 
two goals: flexibility to suit the myriad of compensatory schemes found 
globally, versus consistency to ensure polluters’ environmental liability is 
measured consistently and fairly. Our review suggests that the scope of 
compensatory schemes varies: some aim to offset environmental loss in 
relation to its impact on human wellbeing while others focus on off-
setting biophysical changes regardless of whether they measurably 
affect humans (Table 1). The former may be viewed as reflecting na-
ture’s instrumental values for humans, whereas the latter may reflect its 
non-instrumental values, or possibly a precautionary approach for 
safeguarding human wellbeing by recognizing that full information 
required to link ecosystem structure to services and benefits may never 
exist. This variation in starting points – together with a lack of data to 
capture instrumental values and the conceptual and practical challenges 
of integrating non-instrumental values – makes it difficult to provide a 
Fig. 6. Assessing damage using the cascade model: eelgrass illustration. Assessing damage from marina construction via the framework’s cascade model. The loss of 
an eelgrass meadow (1) and the loss of the physical structure of eelgrass causes the loss of ecosystem functions, services and associated benefits (see Table 2). The 
restricted access and noise disturbance impacts during construction affects nearby beach recreation (2), which are independent of the impacts to eelgrass structure. 
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framework that can be applied consistently across compensation 
schemes with different needs (see also e.g., Bull et al., 2014). Even when 
data are available to populate the existing models, some compensation 
assessments still leave relevant values un-addressed, as underscored by 
Moilanen and Kotiaho (2018), who emphasize the need for more “sys-
tematic and transparent” approaches to compensation design (p. 113). 
Our compensation framework attempts to address these challenges 
by combining a structure founded on the science of ecosystem services 
with the flexibility needed to make it operational in the real world. The 
beneficiaries of a flexible framework include local decision-makers (on a 
policy, legal, or management level), but importantly also the ecosystem 
and those who are dependent on its benefits. Even developers can 
benefit through a more predictable and transparent process that clearly 
defines compensation requirements based on the robust cascade model, 
which makes evident the costs related to damaging biodiversity and 
ecosystem services. 
The framework is designed to work across a variety of compensatory 
schemes, rather than being tied to a specific goal (except the general 
policy objective of halting biodiversity loss). For example, the eelgrass 
case assumed compensation needs based on “No Net Loss of Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services,” as per the EU Biodiversity Strategy. In 
contrast, the US’s Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) goal is 
to “make the public whole;” but this too could be accommodated by 
focusing on the services/benefits levels of the cascade model (see 
Table 1). The expanding scope of offsets today, from a primary emphasis 
on addressing biophysical impacts to a wider scope including the ben-
efits these systems provide, makes the framework’s comprehensive 
focus on all levels of the cascade model particularly salient (Tallis et al., 
2015; Maron et al., 2016; Griffiths et al., 2019). 
We suggest a method for identifying habitat-based compensation 
needs and propose a hierarchy for selecting among suitable compensa-
tion options. At the top of the hierarchy is a suggestion for in-kind 
compensation aimed at the ecosystem structure level. If it can be carried 
out on-site, the benefits of such compensation will reach those affected 
by the damage. But when it cannot, the framework suggests a second 
option where in-kind compensation is provided off-site, together with 
complementary measures. As a last option, a mixture of out-of-kind 
measures may be considered. Regardless of which of these approaches is 
taken, the framework recommends complementary measures any time 
there are cascade-independent impacts on benefits which ensures the 
Fig. 7. Considering preferred compensation options using the cascade model: eelgrass illustration. Two alternative compensation options generated by the 
framework to address eelgrass impacts: The first option (a) includes two components: a(1) restoration of eelgrass meadow at the damage site (in-kind, on-site) to 
restore structure and subsequent functions, services, and benefits and a(2) improve beach access to address loss of benefits that are independent of eelgrass habitat. The 
second option (b) should be considered when the first option is not feasible and contains three components: b(1) restoration of an eelgrass meadow at a close-by 
suitable site (in-kind, off-site) that restores similar functions and subsequent services and benefits, but some of them only at the compensation site, not the 
impacted site. The example illustrates a case where one benefit fully reaches the damage site (green box), one partially reaches the damage site (yellow boxes), and 
one does not (red boxes). Therefore, complementary compensation (on-site/out-of-kind) b(2) could generate a similar ecosystem function (e.g., building a wave 
breaker of rocks). Note that b(2) fully compensates one ecosystem service (green boxes) and partly compensates another (yellow boxes) since the hard substrate 
produces a different community compared to eelgrass. Together with the off-site compensation of this service b(1), the benefits can be considered compensated. 
Finally, as in the first option, recreation enhancement addresses loss of benefits that are independent of eelgrass habitat b(3). Several other considerations are 
relevant before making a final selection of compensation, see text. 
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inclusion of all relevant human benefits in addition to biodiversity (see e. 
g., Jacob et al., 2016). Finally, the “offramp” affords decision makers 
(where it is relevant) the option to reconsider the suitability of the 
damage-causing project if compensation options are considered e.g., 
infeasible, too risky or inconsistent with legal obligations. However, we 
emphasize that this option is not relevant in regulatory contexts in which 
the permitting decisions itself is legally divorced from the compensation 
assessment. 
The framework’s hierarchy offers a path forward for addressing 
compensation under two common scenarios: when data are available 
and when they are not. For example, when data exist (on a detailed or 
summary level) to describe the relationship between ecosystem struc-
ture and subsequent human benefits, the framework can capture rele-
vant instrumental values via the structure of the cascade model, which 
links ecosystem change to its effects on wellbeing (see eelgrass case in 
Section 4). Previous authors have noted possibilities for merging the 
ecosystem services framework into environmental compensation; our 
approach attempts to operationalize this idea to illuminate the full 
spectrum of potentially relevant values in the assessment of damages 
and specification of compensation needs (Olander et al., 2015; Tallis 
et al., 2015; Jacob et al., 2016; Jones and DiPinto, 2018). The cascade 
model structure keeps track of losses and gains, which reduces the risk of 
double-counting benefits and also helps identify compensation options 
that offer multiple benefits. In addition, it keeps track of the ecosystem 
services that are expected from compensation, which is useful when 
evaluating project outcomes (Step 4), particularly in complex cases 
combining in-kind and out-of-kind measures. 
It is far more common, however, that compensation assessment is 
conducted in the absence of data linking changes in ecosystem structure 
to changes in wellbeing. It is here that the framework’s integration with 
the cascade model is particularly helpful, as it leads naturally to the 
hierarchy’s first option: on-site/in-kind compensation aimed at the 
ecosystem structure level. Generating gains at the top of the cascade 
model is the most credible and defensible approach in such cases, as it 
not only captures instrumental values – since they ultimately depend on 
ecosystem structure – but will, by default, select for compensation gains 
for which non-instrumental values are most likely to be relevant (e.g., 
biodiversity). Further, measures aimed at structure reduce exposure to 
measurement uncertainty associated with the cascade links. Through a 
primary focus on structure (in combination with benefits in the lower 
levels of the cascade model) our framework addresses a general criticism 
of compensatory offsetting as an overly-ambitious instrument that fails 
to incorporate the ‘incompatible values’ associated with both ecosystem 
services and biodiversity (Moreno-Mateos et al., 2015; Tallis et al., 
2015). 
Our framework ensures a replicable process, even when compensa-
tion options may be limited, and helps make transparent the fact that 
compensation gains may be experienced differently by different groups 
in society (Bull et al., 2015; Levrel et al., 2017). Flexibility in an off-
setting context is important since nature’s benefits are often diverse, 
complex and difficult to measure, which makes them less amenable to 
simple “substitution” of services (Moreno-Mateos et al., 2015; Tallis 
et al., 2015; Sonter et al., 2020). Moreover, even if substitution (in-kind/ 
on-site) were feasible, local or regional strategic objectives – along with 
legal obligations – may argue for something different. For example, the 
loss of (1) climate mitigation and (2) recreation from a forest could, in 
theory, argue for different compensation approaches, where (1) favors 
fast-growing forests and (2) motivates forest management to select for 
attributes that are preferred by forest users (e.g. biodiversity, accessible 
paths, etc). By mapping “who benefits” and “on what scale” our 
framework makes these trade-offs between compensable values more 
concrete and visible for stakeholders, which affords decision-makers 
flexibility in how best to select, motivate, and communicate their 
compensation selection (Sonter et al., 2020 also emphasize such trade- 
offs in compensation selection). Consideration of different impacts on 
wellbeing may also motivate off-site and out-of-kind approaches, as we 
discuss below. 
Although inspired by the ecosystem services approach suggested by 
Tallis et al. (2015), our framework differs. Whereas Tallis et al. (2015) 
considered the entire mitigation hierarchy, the starting point for our 
approach assumes the existence of residual impacts, despite avoidance 
and minimization. Where relevant, the framework’s offramp option may 
present an even stronger case for avoidance, if following the frame-
work’s four steps still fails to ensure a transparent matching of loss and 
gain – in such cases, the offramp can be seen as a route back to the first 
step in the mitigation hierarchy (avoidance). 
It is important to note that our framework focuses on compensation 
for habitat loss or deterioration, including subsequent effects linked to 
these in terms of ecological functions, ecosystem services and human 
well-being (for example, it does not handle targeted damage to mobile 
species). Further, for highly mobile species (including some birds and 
fish) that are not associated with a single habitat or that alternate be-
tween different habitats through their life cycle, restoring the habitat 
structure will not necessarily lead to the presence of the species in the 
habitat, since this may depend on other external factors. For instance, a 
mobile species may not recover even if the habitat is fully restored off- 
site (as under the second option, cf. Section 3.3) if it shows site fidelity or 
unknown site preferences that prevent it from switching to the restored 
habitat. In such case, complementary measures for these species may be 
needed in order to achieve no net loss. In our framework, this could be 
handled as a cascade-independent impact on benefits, which suggests 
that mobile species, including their associated ecosystem services, be 
assessed separately in the damage and compensation assessments (see e. 
g., Teixeira et al., 2019). 
The framework’s proposed hierarchy prioritizes in-kind/on-site based 
on an underlying assumption that “those affected by damage should 
benefit from the compensation”. This normative assumption may, under 
some conditions, be worth examining closer, not least because it has a 
bearing on the scope for flexibility in compensation selection – a key 
aspect of our framework. The preference for “similar and nearby” 
compensation is supported by differing disciplinary approaches, even if 
regulatory guidance is somewhat ambiguous. For example, ecological 
equivalence models focus on strict similarity between biophysical loss 
and subsequent biophysical gain emphasizing in-kind/on-site in order to 
minimize variability between loss and gain (Quetier and Lavorel, 2011; 
Bezombes et al., 2017; Maron et al., 2018). In contrast, anthropocentric 
approaches suggest a wider perspective where compensation addresses 
the benefits that ecosystems provide (Kiesecker et al., 2009; Tallis et al., 
2015; Jacob et al., 2016; Maron et al., 2016; Griffiths et al., 2019). 
Despite the inherent flexibility in these approaches, they generally 
suggest that the beneficiaries of compensation should be those affected 
by the damage.8 In short, both approaches support “similar and nearby”, 
but one eschews flexibility while the other appears to accept it 
somewhat. 
Yet existing guidance on compensation is equivocal on whether in- 
kind and on-site compensation is, in fact, preferred. Two oft-cited ex ante 
schemes have an explicit preference for in-kind offsets (IFC, 2012; BBOP, 
2012). In contrast, ex post schemes are somewhat ambiguous. For 
example, US NRDA guidance covers compensation selection criteria, but 
none explicitly discusses location or similarity9 (US OPA 1990, CFR 
990.54(a)(1)). Moreover, many of these criteria appear to maximize 
flexibility by emphasizing factors that have a greater bearing on 
8 A slight exception is Griffiths et al. (2018) who suggest that “project 
affected people be no worse off” but this group includes those affected by the 
project as well as those who may be exclusively affected by the compensation.  
9 Only the second criteria suggests consideration of whether a project will “… 
meet the trustees’ goals and objectives in returning the injured natural resources and 
services to baseline …” (see CFR 990.54(a)(2)) but even this indicates the flex-
ibility afforded the Trustees for determining how to handle the injured 
resources. 
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wellbeing (e.g., costs, generation of multiple benefits, public health) 
than on ecosystem structure and function. During the rule-making pro-
cess for these criteria, some commenters criticized the lack of a hierar-
chy favoring in-kind/on-site. The agency’s response – that a hierarchy is 
too restrictive – underscores the importance of flexibility in this system, 
which delegates the question to local decision-makers (USFR 1996, p. 
483). The UN Compensation Commission adopted similar criteria, 
noting that a compensation objective should be “a context-specific stan-
dard,” suggesting the importance of local flexibility10 (Payne and Sand, 
2011, p. 130; UN 2003). The EU’s Liability Directive allows for some 
flexibility in terms of “type, quality” (EC 2004, Annex II, 1.2.2), but 
includes more criteria than in the US and UN guidance, including an 
apparent preference for on-site (see “geographical linkage to the 
damaged site” in EC (2004), Annex II, 1.3.1). These schemes seem to 
favor, implicitly or explicitly, “similar and nearby” but also retain the 
option to deviate, leaving one to wonder who is the designated beneficiary 
from the compensation scheme? 
The assumed criterion that “those affected by damage should benefit 
from the compensation” essentially reduces a scheme’s flexibility, which 
could be viewed in light of increasing interest in more flexible schemes, 
such as habitat banking, despite possible risks (Enetjärn et al., 2015; Bull 
et al., 2015; see also Kiesecker et al., 2009). This criterion takes a very 
specific and subjective position in favoring the wellbeing of those 
affected by damage (the ‘victims’). Although it might be defensible from 
a fairness perspective, this criterion raises questions. For example, how 
to apply it to an out-of-kind measure, which may have uncertain effects 
on the wellbeing of ‘victims’? How to apply it to an off-site measure that 
provides little or no benefit for ‘victims,’ yet provides a net increase in 
overall social wellbeing? One could argue that the latter measure rep-
resents a more efficient way of spending the compensation money 
recovered from a polluter (see e.g., Cole 2013). The fact that such ar-
guments are rare in a compensation setting could perhaps be traced to a 
still unresolved conflict between utilitarian and egalitarian views on 
what compensation should achieve, which might reflect a limited 
discourse about the ethical underpinnings of compensation (Ives and 
Bekessy, 2015; Karlsson and Edvardsson Björnberg, 2020). In reality, 
there may be cases when an alternative criterion could be worth 
considering, such as “the greatest good for the greatest number” or the 
wellbeing of ‘non-victim’ groups. 
A example based on our eelgrass illustration highlights the fact that 
some compensation measures can provide a greater increase in overall 
wellbeing than others, and could be an underlying motivation for 
“trading up” (i.e., replacing a damaged habitat with a relatively higher 
valued one, Habib et al., 2013). In the eelgrass example, the function 
“carbon sequestration” provides uniform global benefits (reduced 
climate impacts) while the function “nutrient uptake” provides more 
local benefits (e.g. improved recreational experience). Depending on the 
scale of preferences, an eelgrass compensation that provides benefits 
associated with the reduction of nutrient pollution at site A, generating a 
value of X may be more favorable in one situation, and eelgrass 
compensation at site B, generating recreational benefits valued at 2X 
may be favored in another. Further, net wellbeing could potentially 
increase even more if option B was less costly (all else equal), which 
explains the prevalence of the cost criterion in compensation guidelines. 
But even if the costs and values generated by two compensation al-
ternatives were equal, one may nonetheless wish to select the measure 
(s) that benefits a particular user group in society because it may be e.g., 
underrepresented, vulnerable, or currently lack access to environmental 
resources (see “system inequality” in Griffiths et al., 2019 as a consid-
eration when assessing an offset’s net impacts on wellbeing). 
Alternatively, a compensation measure aimed at an abundant habitat 
type for which regional conservation priorities are low may be counter- 
productive and difficult to motivate (see e.g., Bull et al., 2014). The 
normative preference for in-kind/on-site compensation found in many 
schemes today suggests that such user groups are ineligible since they 
happen to live off-site; or that local habitats are ineligible for (otherwise 
prioritized) restoration since they are categorized as out-of-kind. Our 
framework allows decision makers to consider these types of local pri-
orities by modifying the compensation needs generated by the cascade 
model (step 2) or by considering the distributional consequences of a 
final compensation selection (step 3). Several aspects could be relevant 
when considering potentially available options including e.g. planning 
for green infrastructure, management plans that prioritize a particular 
habitat or species; political preferences for a particular user group 
(including future generations), or other factors that affect local 
compensatory value, such as a resource’s scarcity, popularity, or 
substitute-ability. Modification to include relevant compensation op-
portunities is consistent with the integration of regional landscape 
planning perspectives, as suggested by Tallis et al. (2015) (see also Saenz 
et al., 2013). 
A trade-off associated with increased flexibility may entail increased 
risk of losses to ecosystem’s structure and function (biodiversity), since 
off-site and out-of-kind measures will never fully compensate for impacts 
on these levels at the damage site. Depending on the legal context, 
excessive flexibility can also conflict with the compensation’s effec-
tiveness in preventing damage in the first place. Bull et al. (2014) note 
that increasing flexibility may turn the “compensation cost” for de-
velopers into a simple fine, underplaying the importance of the damaged 
resource or service. Such an outcome may be avoided, however, if 
compensation needs are assessed comprehensively, as suggested in our 
framework. 
The hypothetical eelgrass example can be helpful for decision- 
makers grappling with the appropriate level of compensation, as it 
highlights an alternative (and equally subjective) assumption about who 
should benefit from a resource-based compensation. Although the 
framework’s transparency can help identify compensation options that 
may improve overall welfare, final selection nonetheless requires the 
weighting of one group’s wellbeing against another’s, including trade- 
offs across space and time (across generations11). In short, even a 
well-structured and transparent compensation assessment does not 
remove the need for local decision-makers to take a stand on difficult 
normative questions associated with whose wellbeing is to be consid-
ered and whose wellbeing matters most.12 Our framework underscores 
the general need for normative policy guidance, as well as specific 
clarification on local levels that consider contextual factors. For 
example, should the “closer is better” principle be followed? And should 
out-of-kind compensation be considered to expand net well-being gains 
even if doing so reduces the possibilities to compensate biodiversity loss, 
complicates the compensation assessment, and attracts a larger and 
more diverse group of stakeholders? We suggest future research be 
aimed at better understanding the ethical implications and the policy 
consequences of alternative criteria for who should benefit from envi-
ronmental compensation. 
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Josefsson, Jonas, Widenfalk, Lina Ahlbäck, Blicharska, Malgorzata, Hedblom, Marcus, 
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